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3Executive summary
Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) are a form of public sector procurement introduced in 
1992. In a PFI the undertaking private consortium raises the finance and designs and 
delivers the project, which is defined by an output specification, for a predefined 
payment stream from the Government. PFIs are often (although not exclusively) used for 
the procurement of construction projects such as hospitals, roads and schools. They 
usually involve a long-term commitment from the consortium to maintain the project for a 
period of usually 15-30 years after construction and extensive risk transfer to the private 
sector. This has not traditionally been a feature of public procurement, and accordingly it 
is has been suggested that PFIs have required substantial external advice to be bought 
in by the public sector.
As little is known about the determinants of these advisor costs the DTI undertook a 
voluntary survey of 58 English Local Authorities who had procured PFI school projects, 
which allowed this and a number of other aspects of PFI procurement to be examined. 
Replies were received from 28 of the Authorities.
The survey returns covered 90 PFI schools (62 secondary 28 primary) procured by the 
Authorities between 1996 and 2002. The most common PFI was for 1 school only and 
covered 1000-2000 students, however there were also a number of larger projects. The 
average project had a cost (NPV of the unitary payment stream1) of £44 million, although 
the modal project cost was somewhat lower at £15-25 million.
The external advisor costs in the survey were on average around £600,000, which was 
2% of the unitary payment. Financial advice usually constituted the highest percentage 
of the advisor costs, followed by legal and technical advice.
Analysis of the survey returns found that the costs of the PFI projects were closely 
related to the number of students/schools involved in a project and whether it was new 
build or refurbishment. There was also evidence that larger projects had longer 
construction times, and that the price of PFI schools has increased over time due to 
rising construction prices.
In contrast the external advisor costs incurred by the Local Authorities were not nearly 
as clearly related to the project details. This was the case with the total external advisor 
costs and also its component costs e.g. legal and financial costs. For the most part the 
advisor costs did not appear to be closely related to the duration of procurement and 
there was no clear cut link between the size of a project and their magnitude. There was 
some evidence that the financial advisor costs might be related to the duration of 
procurement, but it was not particularly strong. The survey found no evidence that the 
advisor costs incurred in the projects have fallen over time.
It seems likely that either no clear relationship between advisor costs and the project 
specification exists, or that it exists but is not sufficiently strong that we can pick it up in 
the data we reviewed. The sample size is relatively small, and there are the associated 
difficulties of a voluntary survey. Another possibility is that advisor costs are determined 
by factors that we can’t directly measure in the survey. The qualitative responses to the 
survey questions indicated that respondents felt that the external advisor costs related 
mainly to planning issues and the lack of experience of the Local Authorities/level of in-
house expertise. It seems plausible that these factors fluctuate from area to area, 
explaining why we are unable to understand the variation in these costs using the project 
specifications. 
                                                
1 Throughout this document the unitary payment will always be in NPV terms.
4As the magnitude of advisor costs seem to be unrelated to the size of the project, this 
implies that on average the advisor cost per school/per student would fall for larger 
projects. However given the substantial variation in the advisor costs it is not possible to 
guarantee that this would be true for any particular project.
The number of bidders for the PFI projects fell over the survey time frame. This effect 
was more pronounced at the pre-qualified bidder stage than the invitation to negotiate 
(ITN) phase. The fall in the numbers seems likely to be due to substantial interest in the 
first wave of PFIs and spare capacity in the construction market at the time.
The net benefit2 and risk transfer of PFIs was found to increase with the size of the 
project, although when expressed as a percentage of the unitary payment there was no 
obvious trend. The more risk a project transferred the higher its net benefit, with the net 
benefit usually being around half of the risk transferred.
Amongst the policy questions raised by this research are: the extent to which employing 
external advisors is more efficient than carrying out the work in house, the degree to 
which there are benefits from centralising procurement expertise and the possible 
benefits of training courses. It is intended that these will be studied through in-depth 
follow up interviews with survey participants. Future work will also focus on the costs that 
the private sector incurred whilst carrying out the projects.
                                                
2 The difference between the risk adjusted public sector comparator (PSC) and the NPV 
of the unitary payment.
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Introduction
1. Background                                                                                                                                                 
This analysis aims to improve understanding of the transaction costs of Private Finance 
Initiatives (PFIs). PFIs are a common way of procuring schools in the UK and are also 
used extensively in the procurement of hospitals, roads and other services. They were 
introduced by the Conservative Government in 1992 and their use has expanded under 
the current Labour Government. In a PFI the design, finance and maintenance of a 
project are all provided by the undertaking private consortium (in some cases it may be a 
subset of the 3). PFIs are typically run on a 15 to 30 year contract, with the consortium 
being paid back in instalments, conditional on performance. On expiry of the contract, 
ownership of the project’s assets usually reverts back to the public sector. PFIs are often 
used for procuring new buildings, but can also be undertaken for refurbishments and 
service provision. 
PFIs long-term contracts require a substantial amount of pre-planning, and it is felt that 
accordingly their procurement may involve large transaction costs. These costs often 
take the form of payments to external advisors/consultants, as many Local Authorities 
are new to PFI procurement and so may require extensive advice. 
6This analysis is based on 28 responses to a voluntary survey of 58 English Local 
Authorities who procured PFI schools since 1995. The full set of survey questions is 
given in Appendix 4.
2. Methodology
The survey returns contain information on a number of aspects of project procurement: 
The type of projects: How many schools were procured, primary/secondary split, the 
number of students, how long construction took and whether the work was new build or 
refurbishment. 
Projects costs and benefits: What was the cost of the project under PFI (the unitary 
payment), the value of the Public Sector Comparator (PSC), how much risk was 
transferred and the net benefit.
The procurement process: How long it took, how many bidders there were, the 
number of people in the procurement team, their previous PFI experience and the hours 
they worked on the project.
The external advisor costs (EACs): Their size and type.
Qualitative information: Some survey questions asked respondents to give qualitative 
answers, and summaries of responses to these are given throughout the text.
      There is no model that integrates all this information in a single framework, so the 
analysis will examine the relationships that exist between different aspects of 
procurement, rather than being driven by any theory as such. We will lay out the 
possible factors that determine areas of interest, and then analyse whether there is a 
corresponding relationship in the data. A number of the questions addressed are listed 
below:
1. What explains the length of a project’s construction period? (Section 4)
2.   What drives the project cost (the unitary payment)? (Section 5)
3.   Is the duration of procurement related to the size of the project? (Section 6)
    
4.   Is there any trend in the number of PFI bidders over time? (Section 6)
5.   How large are the external advisor costs? (Section 7)
6.   What is the distribution between the different types of advisor cost?       
(Section 7)
7.   What determines the external advisor costs? (Section 7)
        
73. Statistical issues
This section covers statistical issues with the survey returns. More specific points on 
the regression analysis of the returns are given in Appendix 2.
Sample size
The survey sample consisted of Local Authorities that had undertaken a PFI schools 
project between 1996-2002. Authorities with ongoing procurement were excluded, to 
avoid causing them disruption. In October 2004, surveys were sent out to the 48 
English Local Authorities that met this criterion, 22 responded (a 46% response rate). 
Additionally there were 6 responses from 10 pilot surveys sent out prior to the main 
survey. These covered some of the areas from the main survey, such as the external 
advisor costs. 
The returns cover a range of Local Authorities around the country and include 
projects of various degrees of size and refurbishment. As the survey was conducted 
on a confidential basis individual Authorities will not be named. 
Although 28 (22 main survey, 6 pilot) survey returns is a good response rate for a 
voluntary survey of 58 (48 main survey, 10 pilot), this is still quite a small number of 
observations. Indeed as most respondents did not answer all the questions 
(Appendix 1 gives the response rate to individual questions), the statistics presented 
are nearly always based on fewer than 28 observations. As a result, although the 
returns cover a range of Local Authorities around the country, it is not possible to 
guarantee that results from the survey are completely representative.
Selection bias
Any voluntary survey faces the risk of selection bias, in that those who choose not to 
reply (either by not returning the survey, or by not answering certain questions) may 
do so for similar reasons. For example, in this survey it may be that non-respondents 
had procurement problems that they were unwilling to discuss. However this is just
one of many potential reasons for non-response and it would be speculative and 
unfair to classify non-respondents without further information.  That the survey 
returns are not necessarily a completely random sample must nevertheless be born 
in mind.
In the case of non-response to individual survey questions, selection bias seems less 
likely to be a problem. This is because the questions, which had a low response rate, 
were often those where there seemed to be a lot of variation in how Local Authorities 
recorded the information. Questions that are not directly compatible with Local 
Authority records are less likely to be answered. Risk transfer information, which had 
a particularly low response rate, is an example of this; one Local Authority had 13 
different categories of risk transferred whilst the survey only had 4.
Errors/ambiguity in survey responses
Some of the answers in the survey responses were incorrect e.g. the external 
advisor costs given were greater than the unitary payment, the unitary payment was 
an implausibly large number etc. When such problems were discovered, attempts 
were made to find supplementary information (either from the outline business case 
or a direct query to the Local Authority) to revise the answer. Despite this checking 
process, it is possible that errors still remain. Statistics which are not officially 
defined, such as the advisor costs, may be more subject to errors than those which 
are (the PSC, the unitary payment, school number etc).
8In some instances answers to questions, whilst not obviously wrong were 
ambiguous. In this case judgements had to be made as to what the respondent 
intended by their answer.
Inflation
The projects’ start dates are spread between 1996 and 2002, so it is probable that 
costs have been affected by inflation. Ideally with the two main types of cost in the 
survey:  the unitary payment and the external advisor costs, dedicated price indices 
would exist to deflate for these effects. Unfortunately things are not so simple.
For the external advisor costs no official price index exists, although the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) is working on one for business services, and using 
professional earnings data as a deflator would be misleading as earnings usually 
grow faster than inflation, thus overstating the level of inflation in the industry. We 
have opted to use the quarterly GDP deflator to deflate the data (base year 2002). 
This is not ideal as national inflation measures are not necessarily representative of 
the rate of growth of advisor costs.
With the unitary payments (and the projects’ risk transfers and benefits) the data was 
deflated using the index for private commercial construction output prices (base year  
2000). A complicating factor is that construction output price increases may well vary 
substantially across the country, so using a national aggregate measure is potentially 
misleading.
Charts and descriptive statistics in this report are based on raw data unless 
otherwise stated. When start dates have been absent this has sometimes resulted in 
reduced sample sizes. All regressions have been run on both raw and deflated data, 
with the results displayed in Appendix 3. 
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4. Type of projects
The number of schools procured
The 28 Local Authorities that responded procured a total of 90 schools between 
them, with the number of schools varying across the projects.
Figure 1 gives a histogram of the numbers of schools that the Local Authorities 
procured in their projects.
Figure 1
In the sample there was one project that had far more schools than the rest, but the 
most common project was for one school only. 
 The balance between primary and secondary schools
Of the 90 schools procured, approximately two thirds were secondary schools3 (62 
secondary, 28 primary). Primary schools were relatively concentrated with (61%) of 
the 28 coming from just three Local Authorities and approximately half of the 
Authorities (15) procuring none at all.
In some cases the responses were at the individual school level, whilst in others the 
results were aggregated. Despite aggregation it is still possible to see that the 
primary schools in the survey are smaller, by plotting a project’s average number of 
students per school against the proportion of its schools that are primary. See Figure 
2.
                                                
3 Secondary schools have been taken to include sixth form colleges.
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Figure 2
Figure 2 shows that the higher the proportion of primary schools in a project, the 
lower the average number of students per school, implying that primary schools have 
fewer pupils. This is a well-known fact, but it is good to see the data confirm it.
The number of students per project
Figure 3
Most projects in the returns had between 1000 and 2000 students. However there 
were three large projects of around 10,000 students each and a number of projects 
spread in the 2000-7000 student range. Two of the three 10,000 students projects 
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involved fewer than 10 schools and were exclusively secondary. The other 10,000 
students project had 15 schools but was a mixture of primary and secondary.
The mix of new build and refurbishment
Figure 4 shows the distribution between new build and refurbishment amongst 
respondents. Most returns covered new build projects. There is some subjectivity in 
classifying projects that aren’t 100% new build, so the results should be treated with 
a degree of caution.
Figure 4
The length of construction time
Figure 5 gives the distribution of construction times from the 16 survey respondents 
that provided information.
Figure 5
The average construction time was 23 months and the standard deviation was 10 
months. Intuitively this should be closely related to the number of schools that were 
procured, and indeed when we plot the two (Figure 6) a positive correlation is 
observed. 
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Figure 6
A clear outlier is the project which had the joint longest construction period but which 
involved nearly half the number of schools as its construction time equivalent (8 and 
15 schools respectively). This is probably due to the 15 schools project having a high 
proportion of primary schools whilst the 8 schools project was 100% secondary and 
therefore involved larger schools. This can be seen by using the number of students 
instead of the number of schools on the x-axis. 
Figure 7
From Figure 7 we can see that the two Local Authorities, despite procuring different 
numbers of schools had similar numbers of students and a similar length of 
construction time. Although the relationship between the number of students and the 
duration of construction appears to be quite close, the robustness is uncertain as, 
due to the small number of large projects, these two Local Authorities determine the 
slope of the line of best fit.
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A further complication on large projects is that the length of construction time is open 
to interpretation. If a project’s schools’ construction periods overlap then the total 
duration of project construction may be less than the hours worked on the project. 
Alternatively the opposite may apply if school construction periods are separated. 
Where construction delays occurred Local Authorities were asked to provide 
responses as to the reasons, some of which are given in the box4 below:
                                                
4 In this and the case of other qualitative replies from survey respondents we have often summarised 
the original comments rather than provided a direct quote.
Qualitative perspective
Reasons for delays in construction:
(This did not apply to most Authorities, as in general projects were completed on 
time.)
1. Planning constraints affecting deliveries.
2. Poor contractor performance.
3. Delay in financial close.
4. Change from Adaption to New build.
5. Construction works were started with insufficient information.
      6.   Incomplete drawings, the design needing to be revisited.
6. Payment difficulties and disputes with sub-contractors.
14
5. Projects costs and benefits:
An assessment of the project costs and their determinants
Figure 8 is a histogram of the NPV of the projects unitary payments. It has been put 
into real terms using the price index for private commercial construction output. The 
projects range in cost from around £12 million to £117 million. The modal project cost 
was in the £15-£25 million range, whilst the average project cost was £44 million 
(The difference reflecting the skewness of the distribution). These figures are based 
on 21 responses.
Figure 8
Unsurprisingly much of the dispersion is due to Local Authorities procuring different 
numbers of schools. If we plot the NPV of the unitary payment in real terms against 
the number of schools procured (Figure 9) then there is a clear positive relation, 
albeit with some outliers: the most expensive project in our sample involved less than 
half the number of schools as the next most expensive. In part this is due to other 
factors that we are not controlling for e.g. the 15 school project was 51-99% new 
build as opposed to 100%, the primary secondary school mix etc. It is possible that 
the slope of the trend line in Figure 9 is skewed downwards by the Local Authorities 
that procured relatively large numbers of schools, of which a high proportion were 
smaller primary schools. The low cost project with 7 schools is an example of this, as 
is the 15 schools project. 
Figure 9
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Given the positive relationship between the number of schools procured and the 
unitary payment, dividing the unitary payment by the number of schools, gives a 
distribution of average costs per school that is more symmetric than the cost 
distribution.
Figure 10
Plotting the NPV of the unitary payment against the number of students in the project 
(Figure 11), we see that there is a strong positive relationship between the two. The 
three projects with the largest numbers of students also had relatively similar unitary 
payments. Though again the most expensive project (6 schools, 6000 students) is an 
outlier, and although the fit looks good, the spread around the 4000 students mark is 
large, ranging from £20m to £63m.
Figure 11
Having examined these relationships graphically we now conduct a regression 
analysis of the determinants of the unitary payments. This allows us to control for the 
effects on costs of multiple aspects of projects.
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Regression analysis of project costs
In this section we discuss the explanatory variables used to understand the 
determinants of PFI project costs in a regression analysis. Results from the analysis 
are then interpreted. Issues involved with regression analysis of the sample are laid 
out in Appendix 2. Although we present only one regression, a number of other 
specifications were estimated.
Explanatory variables
Table 1: Correlations between variables
Correlations greater in absolute value than 0.5 have been shaded. Sample size (17)5
As can be seen in Table 1 variables relating to the project size  (the unitary payment, 
the number of schools, the number of students) are all positively correlated with one 
another. The type of build is negatively correlated with the other size variables, 
although this effect reduces when we use fewer variables and have a larger sample. 
None of the other variables are particularly strongly correlated.
Project size effect
We only want one variable to capture the effect of project size on the unitary payment, 
as otherwise this will be split across the number of students and the number of schools 
and hence hard to distinguish6. In this, and other regressions, the number of students 
is used to capture the project size effect, due to its stronger correlation with the unitary 
payment.
The stronger correlation is probably due to the number of schools being a slightly 
misleading scale variable as it does not take account of the primary/secondary school 
mix, which is captured indirectly by the number of students. Analysing primary and 
secondary school effects in separate explanatory variables is complicated by the 
primary schools in the sample being largely concentrated in 3 Local Authorities, 
making it difficult to disentangle primary school effects from project specific effects.
Type of build
This variable is used to see whether a project being new build or refurbishment had 
any effect on its cost. In the survey it is indexed 1 to 4, where 1 is 0-25% new build 
and 4 is 100% new build.
Procurement start date
This allows us to control for any effects that vary over time such as inflation, changes 
in PFI procedures etc.
                                                
5The correlation coefficients are only calculated on the survey returns where we have complete 
information on the variables listed.
6 The multicollinearity problem, see Appendix 2.
Procurement 
start date
London 
dummy
NPV of the 
unitary payment 
Number of 
students
Number of 
schools
Type of 
Build
Duration of 
procurement
Procurement start date 1.0
London dummy 0.2 1.0
NPV of the unitary payment 0.2 0.1 1.0
Number of students 0.0 0.1 0.9 1.0
Number of schools 0.0 -0.2 0.8 0.8 1.0
Type of Build 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 1.0
Duration of procurement -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3 1.0
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London effect
A dummy variable7 for London is included to see whether there were any effects 
from a project being procured in London as opposed to elsewhere in the country.
The following regression equation was estimated: 
Regression results
Interpretation
The overall fit of the equation is good with an R2 of 86% and all explanatory variables 
(the London dummy excepted) statistically significant. The findings are not 
particularly surprising, and in decreasing order of statistical confidence are as 
follows:
1. The more students in the project the larger the unitary payment. 
This result is highly statistically significant (p value < 0.000) and is very intuitive. We 
have already seen that projects with more students have longer construction periods 
and hence probably cost more. 
2. The higher the proportion of new build in the project the larger the 
unitary payment.
Presumably new build involves more work, though it is sometimes argued that 
refurbishments are more difficult to carry out. It may be that the cost per unit of 
refurbishment is higher, but that refurbishments involve fewer units and hence can in 
aggregate have a lower cost than new build.
                                                
7 A dummy variable is a variable that takes the value 1 when an object has a certain discrete 
characteristic (such as being in London) but which is otherwise 0. 
NPV of the unitary payment  =  a  +  b1(Number of students)+ b2(Type of build)             
+ b3(Procurement start date) + b4(London dummy)
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.93
R Square 0.86
Adjusted R Square 0.82
Standard Error 16098690.60
Observations 20
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 2.36139E+16 5.9E+15 22.7786 3.15456E-06
Residual 15 3.88752E+15 2.6E+14
Total 19 2.75014E+16
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -531343612 210803427 -2.521 0.024 -980660757 -82026467
Number of students 12684 1660 7.643 0.000 9147 16221
Type of Build 16788062 5941978 2.825 0.013 4123029 29453095
Procurement start date 13150 5937 2.215 0.043 495 25805
London Dummy -1420681 8912241 -0.159 0.875 -20416684 17575322
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3.  The size of the unitary payment increased over time.
This is probably due to rising construction prices. When the same regression 
specification is run on unitary payments deflated by the inflation rate for private 
commercial construction (See Appendix 3 for the results) the procurement start date 
became insignificant, but otherwise the results are largely unchanged. As the deflator 
is a national aggregate measure that does not allow us to control for local variation in 
prices this is not complete proof, but is suggestive.
      4.  Procuring a project in London does not affect the unitary payment
We can’t reject the hypothesis that procuring a project in London as opposed to 
elsewhere in England has no effect on the project costs.  However this may be due 
to not having many London projects in the sample. Alternatively as the companies 
that bid for PFIs operate all over the UK there may be a degree of price equalisation 
when bidding for jobs around the country.
Benefits and Risk transfer 
The net benefit of a PFI is the difference between the risk adjusted public sector 
comparator (PSC) and the NPV of the unitary payment. The risk adjusted PSC is 
equal to the estimate of the cost of the project carried out by the public sector plus 
the net risk that has been transferred to the private sector in the PFI. Projects should 
not be carried out as PFIs unless they can show a positive net benefit.
Figure 12 shows the distribution of the net benefits from the PFI projects in the 
survey returns (real terms).
Figure 12
The net benefit of these PFIs appears to be strongly related to the number of 
students, with the three projects that involved the largest numbers of students also 
having the largest net benefits. This can be seen from Figure 13, which plots the net 
benefit of the PFI projects against their number of students. 
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Figure 13
If we plot the benefit of PFI procurement against the risk transferred in the PFI 
(Figure 14) we see that there is also a strong positive relationship between the two, 
suggesting that larger projects transfer more risk. Although the benefit from PFI is 
usually less than the risk transferred. An explanation for this is that contractors want 
compensation for risk bearing and face a higher cost of capital than the public sector. 
For further discussion of this issue in a microeconomic framework see Davies 
(2006).
Figure 14
Figure 15 plots the net benefit of the PFI procurement as a percentage of the unitary 
payment against the number of students in the project. There does not appear to be 
any clear trend between the two.
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Figure 15
Risk transfers
The response rate to the question on how much risk in aggregate was transferred 
was not particularly high (18 Local Authorities). The risk transferred in PFI varied 
between 8% and 19% across the projects where these questions were answered.
Figure 16
Cross plot of the net project benefit (as a percentage of 
the unitary payment) against the number of students
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The response rate on the different types of risk transfers was very low (see Appendix 
1) so no figures will be given from this information.
If we look at the risk transferred as a percentage of the unitary payment plotted 
against the number of students, there does not seem to be a clear relationship. One 
of the large projects transferred risk of 10% of the unitary payment, whilst another 
transferred 17%. Smaller projects were spread about within this range.
Figure 17
Cross plot of the risk transferred as a percentage of the unitary 
payment against the number of students
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6. The procurement process:
Procurement teams past experience
Almost universally the respondents had experience of procurement, but none of PFI 
education projects. Occasionally some of the project team might have had previous 
PFI experience. Given that the use of PFIs has only become widespread since1997, 
this is probably to be expected, as these are relatively early PFI schools projects. 
Nearly everyone surveyed had undergone some form of PFI training.
The duration of procurement
The distribution of the duration of procurement is not dissimilar from the duration of 
construction, with an average procurement time of 22 months and a standard 
deviation of 6 months. This is roughly consistent with the duration of procurement 
found by the Audit Scotland report on PFI schools8. 
Figure 18
The distribution of procurement overruns is plotted in Figure 19 (below), where 
procurement overruns are defined as deviations from the procurement time that was 
expected. The most common situation was no overrun.
Figure 19
                                                
8 That report (p30) defined the procurement period differently, in that it included the construction phase. However 
when the construction time is removed from the figures, the numbers are relatively similar.
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The duration of the procurement does not appear to be closely related to the cost of 
the project (Figure 20). For example, the project which had the longest procurement 
time was one of the cheaper projects, whilst the most expensive project had a below 
average procurement time. Although we don’t show the chart, this finding is 
unchanged if we use the expected duration of procurement on the x-axis.
Figure 20
Correspondingly although the distribution of construction duration is similar to that of 
procurement duration and although construction duration is, as we have seen, 
directly related to the size of the project, there is no clear relation between 
construction and procurement duration when we do a cross plot (Figure 21).
Figure 21
If we look at the duration of procurement plotted against procurement overruns then 
we find a positive correlation (Figure 22). The projects with longer overruns tended to 
be those with a longer procurement periods. However it should be noted that we 
were only able to look at those projects that reported the expected and actual 
procurement time, and there was a relatively low response rate to this.
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Figure 22
The survey asked recipients to explain why procurement time might have deviated 
from the timetable and the difficulties they encountered in procurement. Summaries 
of the responses are given below.
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Qualitative perspective
Why procurement time deviated from timetable:
1. Delays caused by need for additional consultation with schools, planning 
problems and discussion on affordability and scheme scope.
2. Delays due to identification of land and planning issues.
3. Protracted negotiations due to schools becoming new builds not adaptations 
during the process. 
4. Difficulties of initially engaging the PFI contractor in detailed negotiations 
following their selection as preferred bidder.
5. Concerns about the payment mechanism.
6. Delays due to difficulties in contractual wording.
7. First preferred bidder withdrew.
8. Proposed site flooded.
9. Delays by the Treasury in releasing funds.
Major difficulties encountered during procurement and negotiation:
   A wide variety of answers were given including:
1. During construction major changes were made to the works.
2. Dissolution of the bidders joint legal team, which delayed closure of the 
project, added to legal costs and made negotiations more difficult.
3. Construction and insurance prices rising.
4. Construction difficulties ranging from provider’s reluctance to comply 
properly with output specs to payment difficulties. 
5. Obstruction from residents.
6.   Project not sufficiently resourced due to work on other projects. Therefore 
greater reliance on external advisors.
7. Lack of project management by SPV. Lack of coordination and cohesion 
amongst SPV sub contractors.
8. External builder and FM provider going bust.
9. Withdrawal of first preferred bidder.
25
Hours worked by the procurement team
There was information on this from the survey returns, however the answers given 
were so diverse (hours per week, hours varying over time, months, breakdown 
across team members) that it is not possible to provide aggregate figures on this.
Internal cost of procurement
Local Authorities were asked to provide information on their internal cost of 
procurement. Responses to this question came from only 12 Authorities, so these 
statistics should be treated with particular caution. From Figure 23 it seems that the 
internal cost of procurement is usually less than the total external advisor cost (EAC).
Figure 239
Figure 24: plots the internal cost of procurement against the total external advisor 
costs.
                                                
9 Chart based on 11 not 12 observations due to missing procurement start date
Bar chart of Local Authorities internal cost of procurement and their 
total external advisor costs (deflated)
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The number of bidders
Figure 25: Histogram of the number of bidders who pre-qualified for the projects.
There is quite a lot of variation in the number of bidders who pre-qualified for the 
projects. This may be a time effect, as there appears to be a relationship between 
the number of bidders and the date when project procurement started. The earlier 
projects have on average a slightly larger number of pre-qualified bidders (Figure 
26). This may reflect interest from contractors in undertaking the first wave of PFIs. 
Another factor might be that the industry had more spare capacity in the late 90’s, 
but that firms are now busier (as evidenced by rising output) and have less capacity 
to bid for work.
Figure 26
Cross plot of the number of pre-qualified bidders on the 
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There is much less variation in the number of bidders who submitted a bid in 
response to the invitation to negotiate, with the 3 or 4 bidders being by far the most 
common (Figure 27). The projects that involved 6 to 8 bidders were earlier ones.
Figure 27
7. External Advisor Costs (EACs)
We now examine some of the characteristics of the external advisor costs and then 
undertake a regression analysis to try and understand their determinants.
Total External Advisor Costs (EACs)
Figure 28 gives a histogram of the distribution of the total EACs (deflated using the 
GDP deflator) from the sample.
Figure 28
Histogram of total External Advisor Costs (deflated)
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The average total EAC in the sample is £615,000 and the standard deviation is 
£385,519 (undeflated). Figure 29 gives a histogram of the total EAC as a percentage 
of the unitary payment 10.
Figure 29
In percentage terms most EACs are 1.5-3.5 % of the cost of the unitary payment. 
The mean of the distribution is 2% and the standard deviation is 1.3 %. 
The breakdown of advisor costs
External advisor costs in PFIs can take many forms. For example they may be the 
cost of employing lawyers to draw up the contract, payments to accountants for 
working out the project payment schedule, or design fees incurred in assessing the 
bids. The headings used to classify EACs in the survey were:
1. Financial   
2. Legal
3. Technical
4. Insurance
5. Other
The distinction between the different costs is sometimes a grey area, so there may 
be classification issues. Some descriptive statistics on the costs (deflated using the 
GDP deflator) are presented in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 
                                                
10 Note that the total EAC is not included as part of the unitary payment
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Average Standard Deviation Sample Size
Legal £270,896 £177,398 21
Financial £199,522 £145,478 20
Technical £138,190 £135,187 19
Insurance £6,426 £11,766 20
Other £44,631 £134,951 20
Total EAC £640,185 £405,478 23
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Legal advice was the largest EAC on average and also had the largest standard 
deviation. Financial advice was on average the next most expensive, followed by 
Technical, with both having large standard deviations. The low average level of 
EACs for Insurance and Other is largely due to most respondents giving no costs 
under these headings. The high standard deviation of the Other EAC category 
probably arises from respondents using it as a catchall term, for anything that didn’t 
fit cleanly under the other headings.
Figure 30 gives the distribution of the different EACs as a percentage of the total 
EAC for Financial, Legal and Technical costs. The Financial cost information is 
based on 1 less observation than the others. To keep the chart simple the smaller 
Insurance and Other costs have been omitted as most constitute 0% of total EACs.
Figure 30
Legal costs are usually the largest proportion of total EAC followed by 
Financial advice.
In Figure 30 Financial and Legal costs constitute the mainstay of most EACs. Given 
that the Legal costs are distributed to the right of the Financial costs, there is 
evidence that they would normally represent the greatest proportion of the advisor 
costs.  
Technical costs tend to be smaller than Financial and Legal costs.
Figure 30 shows that Technical costs normally constitute a much lower percentage 
of the total EAC than do Financial and Legal, with the mode being around 20% 
(though there are exceptions as shown by the LA whose technical costs accounted 
for 100% of its EAC). 
Without more detailed knowledge of the PFI procurement process it is hard to know 
what is behind these findings. For example, is legal advice more expensive than 
financial advice, or is it just that more is needed? 
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The costs to the private sector
All these figures refer to the costs incurred by the Local Authorities during 
procurement. However the private contractors that bid for PFIs also incur transaction 
costs. Whilst these are not covered in the survey they will hopefully be studied in 
future work. A source of information on this area is the Major Contractors Group 
(MCG) 2005 survey of PFI projects which found that bid costs for the private sector 
overall were on average 6% of the project value. For PFI schools bid costs were £2.4 
million pounds on average, a fall from the 2003 finding of £3.1 million.
Regression analysis of total External Advisor Costs (EACs)
A number of possible explanatory factors for total EACs suggest themselves:
1.  The physical size of the project and its type of build.
2.  The duration of procurement. 
3.  When the project was procured.
4.  The past experience of the procurer.
5.  Regional effects. 
However, as can be seen from Figures 31 and 32, total EACs (deflated using GDP 
deflator) don’t appear to be very closely related to some of these factors (the number 
of students and the duration of procurement respectively). In order to assess whether 
this is true more generally we carry out a regression analysis of the returns. See 
Appendix 2 for information on some of the issues involved in regression analysis.
Figure 31
Figure 32
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Cross plot of total External Advisor Costs (deflated) 
against the duration of procurement
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Explanatory variables
In trying to understand the determinants of advisor costs we felt that there were a 
number of factors that might be influential:
Project size 
It seemed possible that there might be a relationship between the size of the project 
and its advisor costs. As when analysing project costs we used the number of 
students to capture this effect. The rationale for this is given on page 16.
The type of build
This variable is used to see whether a project being new build or refurbishment had 
any effect on its cost. In the survey it is indexed 1 to 4, where 4 is 100% new build 
and 1 is 0-25% new build.
The duration of procurement
This is an obvious variable to include, as it is one of the few direct procurement 
variables in the survey. 
Procurement start date
This allows us to control for any effects that vary over time, such as inflation in 
advisor costs, changes in PFI procedures etc
The experience of procurers
As these are relatively early PFI school projects, overwhelmingly respondents had 
traditional procurement experience but none of PFIs. There would not be much to 
learn from including this information in a regression equation, so it was omitted.
London effect
A dummy variable for London11 is included to see whether there are any effects from 
a project being procured in London as opposed to elsewhere in the country.
Table 3: Correlations between explanatory variables.
Correlations greater in absolute value than 0.5 have been shaded. Sample size (18).
                                                
11 A dummy variable is a variable that is given the value 1 when an object has a certain discrete 
characteristic (such as being in London) but which is otherwise 0. 
Number of 
students
Build 
type
Procurement 
start date
Duration of 
procurement
London 
dummy
Number of students 1.0
Build type -0.7 1.0
Procurement start date 0.0 0.0 1.0
Duration of procurement 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 1.0
London dummy 0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.2 1.0
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From Table 3 we can see that the type of build is negatively correlated with the 
number of students. However this is the only variable which had a correlation greater 
in absolute terms than 0.5, so hopefully multicollinearity problems (see Appendix 2) 
will be minimised.
The following regression equation was estimated:
Regression results
Interpretation
1.   We are unable to explain most of the variation in total External Advisor 
Costs
Considering the high ratio of explanatory variables to the number of observations we 
are able to explain relatively little of the variation in the data. In adjusted R2 terms 
only a very small percentage (4%) of the variation can be explained and none of the 
explanatory variables are significant at the 95% confidence level.
This contrasts with our success in explaining the variation in the unitary payment.  
2.  The total External Advisor Costs seem unrelated to the number of students, 
the type of build and whether the project is in London or not
All these variables have t statistics that are very insignificant, so we are unable to 
reject the hypothesis that they have no effect on the level of total advisor costs.
If EACs are independent of the size of the project then we would expect the EAC per 
school (or per student) to fall as the scale of the project increases. However there is 
a lot of variation in the costs, so it is not possible to guarantee this for any particular 
project.
Total EAC = a + b1(Number of students)  +   b2(Type of build) + b3(Duration of 
procurement) + b4(Procurement start date) + b5(London dummy)
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.56
R Square 0.31
Adjusted R Square 0.04
Standard Error 410968.85
Observations 19
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 9.85756E+11 1.97151E+11 1.167297811 0.376071184
Residual 13 2.19564E+12 1.68895E+11
Total 18 3.1814E+12
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -14028818 7002077 -2.004 0.066 -29155883 1098247
Number of students -7 44 -0.166 0.871 -101 87
Type of Build 16201 157431 0.103 0.920 -323907 356310
Duration of procurement  20587 17395 1.184 0.258 -16992 58166
Procurement start date 387 191 2.022 0.064 -26 799
London dummy 128275 233895 0.548 0.593 -377025 633575
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It’s intuitive that advisor costs should be less directly related to a project’s 
specifications than its actual cost, and so perhaps not that surprising that we can 
explain less of the variation. Whilst we are unable to reject the hypotheses that our 
explanatory variables have of no effects on advisor costs, it is also possible that our 
sample size is just not large enough for us to pick up any relationships that exist. 
This is a particular issue given the possibility for measurement error in EACs.
3.  Evidence that projects that were procured later had higher advisor costs
The variable that is most significant in determining the EAC is the procurement start 
date, which has a coefficient that is significant at the 94% confidence level. As 
mentioned earlier this term may be picking up some of the effects of inflation over the 
period in which the projects were procured. However, when the regression is 
deflated (see Appendix 3) the result becomes only marginally less significant. In part 
this may be a sampling effect, as some of the later projects in the survey had large 
advisor costs, which it would probably be difficult to explain through inflation alone. 
However it is also possible that PFI guidance has become more proscriptive over 
time leading to a greater need for external advice.
If the advisor costs are largely independent of the size of the project then this begs 
the question of what is causing them. The main source of information that we have 
on this is from the qualitative responses to the survey given below.
     
      When we look at the qualitative responses to the question as to what drives PFI 
procurement costs, none of our regression’s explanatory variables are mentioned. 
However, as most of the respondents had only worked on one PFI project they may 
be less aware of the effects of these factors. Of the factors mentioned in the answers 
it seems plausible that 1 and 4 might be subject to substantial variation around the 
country, which could account for our relative inability to explain advisor costs.
Qualitative Perspective
Q: What are the main drivers of PFI procurement costs?
                
1.   Consultant’s fees (legal, finance and design). They are needed due to 
the lack of in-house specialist knowledge/ experience.
2. The financial institutions wanting certainty, and as a result demanding 
a large amount of detailed information.
3. Bidders looking to recover costs/ taking a pessimistic view of the 
project.
   4.   Complicated planning issues.
Q: Possible remedies to lower procurement costs?
   There was a clear feeling for greater standardisation of the documentation.
Q: If the local authority has undertaken more than one PFI project what 
lessons were learnt from previous experience, where were cost 
savings and what did you do differently?
1.   Low costs due to doing a lot of the legal and financial work in-house. 
2. Reusing the PFI team across time and local areas to work on PFI 
projects.
3. You know how to do things better the second time around.
   4.  The need for retaining expertise and knowledge.
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      Analysing the determinants of the different types of External Advisor Costs
We have been unable to find a robust relationship between the total EACs and our 
information on the projects. As the total EAC is mainly composed of the Financial, 
Legal and Technical advisor costs it might be hoped that a better understanding 
could be obtained from a separate analysis of these. Indeed an interesting possibility 
would be that the individual components of the total EAC are determined by our 
explanatory variables, but with the effects acting in opposite directions, thus 
cancelling out and leaving the aggregate measure of total EAC unexplained.
We now discuss the results of the regression analysis on the different advisor costs, 
however with one exception our findings remain largely unchanged. The regression 
results are presented in Appendix 3. The response rate for the total EAC was higher 
than that for the advisor cost breakdown, so the read across between the two is not 
absolute (see Appendix 1). 
Results of regression analysis on components of total External Advisor Costs 
If we try and explain the components of the total EACs using the same explanatory 
variables, the results are fairly similar to those obtained earlier and are summarised 
below. 
1.      Neither the size of the project, its type of build, its date of procurement start, or 
whether it is in London have effects statistically different from 0 in explaining 
the various components of external advisor costs.
2.      A relatively low percentage of the variation of the individual advisor costs is 
explained by the variables, particularly when one considers the high ratio of 
explanatory variables to sample size.
3.      There seems to be an effect of duration of procurement on financial advisor 
costs (though not for the other types of costs) that is significant at the 96% 
confidence level. The longer the duration of procurement the greater the 
external Financial advisor costs.
However this last result is partly due to an outlier, as can be seen from Figure 33. 
The outlier has by far the largest Financial advisor costs and also the longest 
duration of procurement. When this observation is omitted from the regression, the 
relationship becomes much less significant.
The finding also raises the question of what form the relationship between the 
duration of procurement and the financial advice takes. Is it that until the financing is 
resolved the project cannot go ahead? Or are both the financing and the duration of 
procurement determined by a third variable?
The insignificance of procurement start date may be due to these regressions being 
based on a smaller sample than the total external advisor cost regressions. There is 
some evidence of an effect on Technical advisor costs. Deflating the series does not 
change the significance of the procurement start date substantially.
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Figure 33
Although it is hard to explain the individual advisor costs in terms of the information 
that we have on the project, there is some evidence that they are caused by similar 
factors. 
Figure 34
In Figure 34 there are two outliers, but in general when a Local Authority had a high 
Financial advisor cost it also had a high Legal advisor cost. This is based on a larger 
sample than the duration of procurement information, and so is probably more robust 
than the duration of procurement/Financial advisor costs relationship.  
A slight caution is that given the degree of ambiguity between financial and legal 
advice it is possible the relationship may partly be due to respondents averaging the 
total cost over the two categories. However it seems intuitive that the correlation 
could be due to joint causation from some of the factors (in-house expertise, 
planning issues) that we listed earlier.
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Conclusions and summary
8. Conclusions:
Projects were more expensive if they involved more students, had a higher 
percentage of new build or were built more recently. These findings were statistically 
robust and explain nearly all the variation in costs. This is very intuitive and 
consistent with the finding that the duration of construction was found to increase 
with the physical size of the project. 
By contrast we were unable to explain the costs of the external advisors anywhere 
near as well. The regression results indicate that the total external advisor costs 
were not related to the size of the projects or how long they took to procure. 
Similar results were obtained when we examined the external advisor costs 
disaggregated into financial, legal and technical advisor costs. A relationship 
between the duration of procurement and the financial advisor costs was found. 
However, this was largely driven by an outlier. In general the duration of project 
procurement was not closely related to the cost of the project or the external advisor 
costs.
There was evidence that projects’ unitary payments and total external advisor costs 
have risen over time. This may be due to the effects of inflation over the period in 
which our projects were procured, although the evidence for this was stronger for the 
project costs than for the advisor costs. A finding which probably reflects a higher 
inflation rate for construction projects than consultants fees.
Given that the external advisor costs seem independent of the physical scope of the 
project one might regard them as being generated by the idiosyncrasies of local 
conditions. Judging from the qualitative returns, factors that determine the advisor 
costs include: lack of in-house knowledge/specialist experience and planning issues. 
These may well vary across Local Authorities and might explain the variation that we 
are unable to account for. As financial and the legal costs were positively correlated 
with one another, there was evidence that, although we can’t directly explain the 
advisor costs using the information in the survey, the different types of advisor costs 
had a common cause.
                       
The independence of advisor costs from the physical scope of the project means that 
the advisor costs per student/per school will in general fall with the size of the 
project. However as there seems to be a lot of variation in costs it would be hard to 
guarantee this for an individual project. 
The caveat to the advisor cost findings is that our sample size may just not be large 
enough to pick up relationships that exist between total external advisor costs and 
the chosen explanatory variables. The sample is undoubtedly small and there is a 
risk of selection bias. In addition advisor costs unlike the NPV of the unitary payment 
(the returns on which, were themselves found to contain errors) are not officially 
defined and may therefore be subject to more measurement error.
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9. Summary of results
1. Surveys were sent to 58 English Local Authorities, with responses received 
from 28. The replying Authorities procured 90 PFI schools (62 secondary, 
28 primary) between 1996 and 2002. Most projects were the first PFI 
education project that the Authorities had undertaken.
2. PFI projects in the survey returns ranged in size from 1 school to 15. With 
projects of 1 school being the most common. The modal cost of the 
projects (the NPV of the unitary payment stream) was around £15-25 
million. The average cost was £44 million.
3. The costs of the PFI projects were strongly positively related to the number 
of students involved in each project and the proportion of the project that 
was new build.
4. PFI projects that were procured more recently, were found to be more 
expensive. This seems to be due to the effects of inflation in commercial 
construction prices over the sample time frame.
5. Larger projects had longer construction periods.
6. The net benefit of the PFI projects increased with the physical size of the 
projects. However as a percentage of the unitary payment, the net benefit 
did not seem related to project size. The same was true of the risk 
transferred.
7.   The net benefits of the PFI projects were strongly positively correlated with 
the risk transferred, with the benefit usually being approximately half of the 
risk transfer.
8. The duration of project procurement did not seem to be related to the size 
of the project. Some projects that were large/expensive had a short 
procurement time, whilst smaller/cheaper projects had longer ones.
9. There is evidence that the average number of pre-qualified bidders has 
declined over time. By contrast the number of bidders who submitted bids 
in response to the invitation to negotiate seems to be stable at 3 – 4, 
although older projects had slightly more bidders.
10.    The average total external advisor cost was around £600,000 though there 
was substantial variation. On average the total external advisor costs were 
2% of the NPV of the unitary payment.
   11.    Legal costs usually constituted the largest proportion of external advisor 
costs, followed by financial and technical costs.
12. The total costs of external advisors were not related to the size of the 
projects. However our sample is not particularly large and may be subject 
to measurement error, so this finding has to be treated with some caution.
13. There was qualitative evidence that advisor costs were determined by the        
level of in-house expertise of the Local Authority and planning issues.
14.    If the advisor costs on the project are generated by random local 
procurement conditions, then the advisor cost per school/per student will 
on average be lower for larger projects. However this does not mean that 
larger projects advisor costs are lower in any absolute sense, or that this 
could be guaranteed for any particular project.
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15.    Although there is some evidence that the financial advisor costs are 
related to the duration of procurement, the rest of the external advisor 
costs appear independent of the details of the project.
16.    Financial and legal advisor costs which constitute the mainstay of the total 
advisor costs are strongly positively correlated, suggesting that perhaps 
both are caused by similar factors.
10. Policy implications
Our main finding was that the external advisor costs of Local Authorities were 
independent of their PFI projects size and type. Although we have noted some 
substantial caveats to this finding, we now explore its policy implications.
A priori one might have expected to find a relationship between the nature of the 
project and the advisor costs in the data. Why do some Authorities procure similar 
projects with very different levels of external advisor costs and vice versa? Potential 
drivers of the advisor costs mentioned in the qualitative answers (but which we 
couldn’t control for) were the level of in-house expertise and issues that arose during 
the procurement process. The two are not necessarily independent, as difficulties on 
the project leading to reliance on external advisors, may be contingent on whether 
the Authority lacks the expertise or resources to deal with the situation.
If advisor costs are driven by the necessity of buying in external advice due to lack of 
internal expertise, then this raises the question of what is the most efficient 
procurement arrangement. That an Authority had high external advisor costs does 
not necessarily mean its procurement was inefficient. It may be that it was cheaper to 
buy in expertise for infrequent large-scale procurement, than to have it permanently 
in-house. There is information on the internal cost of procurement of Authorities from 
the survey, but it is based on a very small sample so it is hard to tell whether there is 
an internal-external cost trade off. Presumably the extent to which external advice is 
more efficient would depend on local circumstances.
Another issue is the extent to which there are standard elements of procurement 
expertise that could be centralised at less expense than the use of external 
consultancies or internal staff. Given that the value for money assessment of PFIs is 
meant to be a common aspect for all projects there may be scope for this.
It has been suggested that there might be a downward trend in advisor costs over 
time as Authorities become more experienced with PFIs, but we have failed to find 
evidence of this. This is probably because most of the projects are early school PFIs 
and were the Authorities’ first PFI education project. Although as the projects were 
spread over a number of years one might have hoped to see evidence of effects 
from the diffusion of best practice. Presumably one of the best means of 
disseminating best practice are training courses. Nearly all the survey respondents 
had undergone some kind of training, but it would be good to understand the form it 
took in more detail. If there were common gaps in local expertise that led to the 
advisor costs increasing, and could be filled by training then this would be worth 
considering.
Before making more specific recommendations it seems sensible that a number of 
the survey respondents be interviewed to help understand these issues better.
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Appendices
Appendix 1:  Response rate to survey questions
Amongst the 28 (22 main survey, 6 pilot) survey returns, the response rate and 
comprehensiveness of answers to questions varied. Some Local Authorities 
answered nearly all the questions, whilst others only partially completed the survey. 
In the latter situation, if the outline business case for the PFI was provided, this was 
interpreted to fill the gaps. In some instances, answers in the survey were not exactly 
the same as answers in the outline business case. In this case a judgement was 
made as to which response should be used. Response rates to individual questions
were not uniformly distributed, with some being answered more than others. (See 
Table 1)
Table 1: Response rate to survey questions amongst returns12
(Including answers found in the outline business case).
As can be seen the response rate varies greatly across the questions, going from 28 
(100%) on the number of pupils, to only 5 (18%) when asked for the size of “other” 
risk transfers. There is a range of response rates between these values for the other 
questions. The gaps in information caused by the varying response rates leads to 
problems with interpreting the data, an issue which is discussed in more detail in the 
next section. Regressions and charts may be based on fewer observations than 
given here due to the absence of complete information on combinations of variables.
                                                
12 In some cases there is ambiguity whether blank responses constitute a non-response or a 
0 quantity, which may affect the results. Response rates of 20 or less have been shaded.
Number of Schools and project classification Response rate Procurement Information Response rate
Number of primary schools 28/28 Internal cost of procurement 12/28
Number of secondary schools 28/28 Previous procurement experience 26/28
Project Classification                                                                    
(4 = 100% new build to 1 = 0-25% new build) 27/28 Training 21/28
Construction Information First PFI project 26/28
Contract duration ( years ) 22/28 PQ Bidders 25/28
Expected duration of procurement 18/28 ITN Bidders 25/28
Actual duration of procurement  21/28 Public Sector Comparator (PSC) Information
Expected Construction cost 26/28 NPV PSC 20/28
Actual Construction cost 13/28 Capital Cost 19/28
Duration of Construction ( months) 16/28 Running Cost 16/28
Project Specification Other Costs 7/28
Area (hectares) 12/28 Risks transfer Information
GF Size (m2) 20/28 NPV of risks transferred to the private sector 18/28
Number of students 28/28 Late completion risk 6/28
Number of Classrooms 19/28 Construction cost overrun risk 5/28
External Advisor Costs (EACs) Operational risk 8/28
Financial 24/28 Other costs 5/28
Legal 25/28 Cost of PFI and Risk Adjusted PSC
Technical 23/28 Risk adjusted PSC 20/28
Insurance 21/28 NPV of the unitary payment stream under PFI 25/28
Other 24/28 Net benefit of procurement through PFI 20/28
Total 27/28
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Appendix 2: Regression Issues
Comparing data using only one characteristic (or even 2 or 3 in a chart) is potentially 
misleading, as it does not take full account of the fact that observed differences may 
be due to other characteristics that are not controlled for. Regression techniques 
tackle this problem by allowing us to examine relationships between many variables, 
and are therefore used extensively in this paper. Unfortunately there are a number of 
difficulties with applying this approach to the survey data, some of which (the list is 
not exhaustive) are discussed below.
Incomplete survey response 
To carry out multiple regression analysis on the entire sample we ideally need 
complete information on all the desired explanatory and dependent variables, for all 
the Local Authorities. However as the response rate to the survey questions has 
varied from authority to authority, it is not possible to use all the survey responses. If 
we had a larger sample where the gaps constituted only a small percentage of the 
dataset then we could try and impute the missing values but unfortunately this is 
infeasible given our sample size. The result is that we have to drop returns from 
Local Authorities in order to run regressions. This reduces the sample size and 
makes it harder to draw inferences. A further complication is that the observations on 
which individual regressions are based will not be the same from regression to 
regression.
Multicollinearity 
If we use variables to understand a particular characteristic, that are highly correlated 
with each other, then it becomes hard to distinguish the separate effects. Variables 
may be jointly statistically significant in determining a quantity but be individually 
insignificant. This means that it is important to analyse relationships between the 
explanatory variables. For example, as the number of schools procured in a project 
is related to the number of students, we need to take this into account when trying to 
explain the total EAC in terms of both. 
Sample thinning and outliers
As we try and control for more variables our sample becomes “thinner”, in that we 
are spreading it over a larger space of possibilities and so are less able to get 
reliable information on effects of combinations of individual variables. This can be a 
problem even with quite large samples if the number of explanatory variables used in 
the analysis is also large. As an example of this: If we look at a sample using just 
one characteristic we may find that 50% have that characteristic and the rest don’t. 
However if we also try and look at 6 other characteristics as well, then for any 
particular combination of these we may be looking at only a few observations and so 
it can be hard to infer anything. 
Although a range of projects are covered in the survey returns, the coverage is not 
uniform. There are a few very large projects, many small ones and not many in the 
middle. In certain situations this has meant that the slope of the regression line is 
determined by the large projects and we don’t know how representative these are.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Limits to the number of explanatory variables/loss of degrees of freedom
For a sample of n observations we can run a regression (with a constant term) on at 
most  n -1 explanatory variables. As our sample size is quite small, this upper bound 
is not particularly large and can lead to a misleadingly high R2. For example a 100% 
R2 is guaranteed13 with n -1 explanatory variables, even if they are completely 
unrelated to the dependent variable.
                                                
13 Assuming linear independence of the explanatory variables and the constant vector.
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Appendix 3: Additional regression results
Unitary payment regression deflated by private commercial construction 
output prices
Total External Advisor Cost regression deflated using the GDP deflator
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.94
R Square 0.89
Adjusted R Square 0.86
Standard Error 12727147.44
Observations 20
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 2.01204E+16 5.03E+15 31.05381 4.25664E-07
Residual 15 2.4297E+15 1.62E+14
Total 19 2.25501E+16
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -190863791 166654939 -1.15 0.27 -546080603 164353021
Number of students 12246 1312 9.33 0.00 9450 15043
Type of build 13771984 4697551 2.93 0.01 3759384 23784583
Procurement start date 4085 4694 0.87 0.40 -5920 14089
London 1153101 7045753 0.16 0.87 -13864575 16170778
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.53
R Square 0.28
Adjusted R Square 0.00
Standard Error 424056.64
Observations 19
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 9.03912E+11 1.81E+11 1.005329 0.452678073
Residual 13 2.33771E+12 1.8E+11
Total 18 3.24162E+12
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -13186819 7225067 -1.83 0.09 -28795623 2421986
Number of students -7 45 -0.15 0.88 -104 90
Type of build 17722 162444 0.11 0.91 -333218 368662
Procurement start date 363 197 1.84 0.09 -63 789
Duration of procurement  21825 17949 1.22 0.25 -16951 60600
London dummy 117604 241344 0.49 0.63 -403788 638996
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Legal Advisor Cost regression
Legal Advisor Cost regression deflated using the GDP deflator
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.46
R Square 0.21
Adjusted R Square -0.14
Standard Error 194909.32
Observations 17
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 1.14E+11 2.28E+10 0.60016463 0.7013666
Residual 11 4.17886E+11 3.799E+10
Total 16 5.31886E+11
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -1563510 3900785 -0.40 0.70 -10149083 7022064
Number of Students 9 22 0.38 0.71 -41 58
Type of Build -30176 76503 -0.39 0.70 -198559 138206
Procurement start Date 50 105 0.48 0.64 -182 282
Duration of procurement 2373 8670 0.27 0.79 -16710 21455
London dummy 153628 135958 1.13 0.28 -145614 452870
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.44
R Square 0.19
Adjusted R Square -0.17
Standard Error 203270.25
Observations 17
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 1.09117E+11 2.18E+10 0.528173563 0.750888681
Residual 11 4.54507E+11 4.13E+10
Total 16 5.63624E+11
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -997744 4068115 -0.25 0.81 -9951609 7956121
Number of students 10 23 0.41 0.69 -42 61
 Type of Build -31811 79785 -0.40 0.70 -207417 143795
Procurement start date 35 110 0.32 0.76 -207 277
Duration of procurement  2453 9042 0.27 0.79 -17449 22354
London dummy 153526 141790 1.08 0.30 -158552 465605
43
Financial Advisor Cost regression
Financial Advisor Cost regression deflated using the GDP deflator
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.57
R Square 0.33
Adjusted R Square -0.01
Standard Error 150642.31
Observations 16
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 1.09587E+11 2.1917E+10 0.96582117 0.482344751
Residual 10 2.26931E+11 2.2693E+10
Total 15 3.36518E+11
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -3176548 3015686 -1.05 0.32 -9895917 3542821
Number of Students 4 18 0.20 0.85 -36 43
Type of Build 13578 69916 0.19 0.85 -142206 169361
Procurement start date 82 81 1.01 0.34 -99 264
Duration of procurement 14081 6835 2.06 0.07 -1148 29309
London dummy -26762 106767 -0.25 0.81 -264654 211130
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.56
R Square 0.32
Adjusted R Square -0.03
Standard Error 161269.76
Observations 16
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 1.20222E+11 24044469295 0.924505 0.503946908
Residual 10 2.60079E+11 26007934477
Total 15 3.80302E+11
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -2915143 3228436 -0.90 0.39 -10108547 4278262
Number of  students 4 19 0.20 0.85 -39 47
Type of build 13902 74849 0.19 0.86 -152872 180675
Procurement start date 75 87 0.86 0.41 -119 269
Duration of procurement  period14887 7317 2.03 0.07 -1415 31190
London dummy -29815 114299 -0.26 0.80 -284490 224859
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Technical Advisor Cost regression
Technical Advisor Cost regression deflated using the GDP deflator
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.51
R Square 0.26
Adjusted R Square -0.14
Standard Error 155118.61
Observations 15
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 7.78E+10 15565326527 0.646890011 0.671282558
Residual 9 2.17E+11 24061782158
Total 14 2.94E+11
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -5421782 3328531 -1.63 0.14 -12951448 2107885
Number of students -15 19 -0.79 0.45 -58 28
Type of build -19626 76491 -0.26 0.80 -192661 153409
Procurement start date 153 89 1.73 0.12 -47 354
Duration of procurement  3142 7252 0.43 0.68 -13264 19549
London dummy -52454 110621 -0.47 0.65 -302695 197788
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.53
R Square 0.28
Adjusted R Square -0.12
Standard Error 151376.03
Observations 15.00
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 8.12E+10 16235910272 0.708536842 0.631947476
Residual 9 2.06E+11 22914701562
Total 14 2.87E+11
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -5509823.433 3248223 -1.69625769 0.124071274 -12857820.2 1838173
Number of students -15 18 -0.79 0.45 -56 27
Type of build -21626 74646 -0.29 0.78 -190486 147235
Procurement start date 156 86 1.80 0.10 -40 351
Duration of procurement  2882 7077 0.41 0.69 -13129 18892
London dummy -49121 107952 -0.46 0.66 -293325 195083
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Appendix 4: The survey questionnaire
LOCAL AUTHORITY PFI 
PROCUREMENT SURVEY
Please complete and return this form by: 12th November 2004
Please use one form per project.
(We understand that not all of these questions may be applicable to yourselves, 
but would appreciate it if you could complete the form as fully as possible).
1.   Local Authority Name & Address
2. Contact Name
3. Telephone Number
4. Project Name
(Please confirm the type of procurement used after stating the project name)
a) Project Name
b) If more than one school is included within the project could you please state 
the number of:
1) Secondary Schools
2) Primary Schools
3) Other (Please specify)
c) Site Address
d) Project Classification: (Place a cross in one box only)
0 –25% New build
        26% - 50% New Build     
51% - 99% New Build
100% New Build
5. Net Present Value of the unitary payment stream.
6. Contract duration (in years).
7. Could you please provide the date and duration of the procurement period 
(period of time from OJEU notice to financial close)?
a) Date: From to 
b) Duration (months)
8.   If there was a significant deviation in the procurement duration from the 
anticipated timetable can you specify the length of deviation and explain why 
it occurred?
9.What was the estimated and actual cost of construction? If there was a 
significant cost variation from the estimated figure can you explain why?
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10. Could you please provide the date and duration of the construction period? 
(The period of time from when the contractor started on site work until the date 
when the school was available for use).           
a) Date: From:   To:
b) Duration (months)
11. If there was a significant deviation in the construction duration from the 
anticipated timetable can you specify the length of deviation and explain why it 
occurred? 
12. Can you please specify the size of project in terms of? 
a) Development area (hectares) b) Gross floor size (m2) c) Number of pupils 
d) Number of classrooms
13. What was the total external advisor cost for each of the following?
a)Financial, Legal, Technical, Insurance, Other (please specify),
Total external advisor cost   
14. How large was the internal procurement team (number of staff who work for 
the local authority and participated in the procurement process)? 
15. On average how many hours per week did the internal procurement team 
spend working solely on the project stated in question 1?
16. What was the internal cost of procurement?
17. Did the internal procurement team have any previous procurement 
experience?  
18. What PFI training programs did the internal procurement team attend?
19. Can you outline any major difficulties that you encountered during the 
procurement and construction phase?
20. Was this project the first education related PFI project? If not how many 
previous PFI projects have been undertaken?
21. If your local authority has undertaken more than one PFI project what 
lessons were learnt from the previous experiences, where were cost savings made 
on subsequent projects and what did you do differently?
22. How many bidders pre-qualified? (Can you please specify their names)?
23. How many bidders submitted bids in response to the ITN? (Can you please 
specify their names, the preferred bidder and who won the contract)?
24. What do you believe are the main drivers of PFI procurement costs?
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25. What are the possible remedies to lower procurement costs?
26. To assist in the DTI’s study on PFI procurement costs could you provide a 
copy of the final outline business case?
27. What was the net present value of the public sector comparator (PSC) and 
what was the net benefit of procurement through the PFI?
a) NPV Public sector comparator 
Can you please also disaggregate the NPV PSC and report the following 
1) Capital cost
2) Running costs 
(Which include operating costs, repair and maintenance costs)
3) Other
b) NPV of risks transferred to the private sector 
Can you please also disaggregate the NPV of risks transferred to the private 
sector and report the following 
1.Late completion risk
2.Construction cost overrun risk
3.Operational risk
(Which includes running costs, maintenance and repair costs)
4.Other
c) Risk adjusted PSC (a + b)
d) NPV of the unitary payment stream under PFI
e) Net benefit of procurement through the PFI (c – d)
28. The DTI plans to benchmark PFI performance against traditional government 
procurement. In order to do this the DTI needs procurement cost and 
construction cost data for schools that were built using conventional government 
procurement. If you have built a school using conventional procurement the DTI 
would be grateful if you could also complete a separate conventional 
procurement survey that can be found in the appendix. 
29.  Please feel free to make any additional comments that are not covered in the 
above questions.
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